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several other companies.) and one 
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public companies involved in skin-
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point of personal experiences—first 
as academics and later as industry-
based individuals (EAB; Washington 
University, faculty member (1974–
1988); Stanford University, faculty 
member (1988–present, now emeri-
tus); Dermatology Department chair-
man (1988–1995); Program Director of 
the General Clinical Research Center 
(1991–1994); Dean of the School of 
Medicine (1995–2001); Vice President 
for Medical Affairs (1997–2001); 
one of three founders of Connetics 
Corporation (1993), served on its Board 
of Directors (1993–2005), acquired by 
Stiefel Laboratories (2006); founding 
CEO of Neosil (2004), a venture-funded 
dermatology company, acquired by 
Peplin, an Australian Dermatology 
company (2008); President & Chief 
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Over the past 25 years both the quality and quantity of pharmaceutical and 
biopharmaceutical research has changed.  Formerly rigidly separated research 
efforts in academic institutions and the biopharmaceutical industry have 
become increasingly transparent to one another.  Industry has in some cases 
scaled down its internal research efforts, while enhancing its outreach to basic 
research in academic institutions.  In parallel, research at academic institutions 
has—in some cases—added a focus on application of discoveries to patient 
needs.  This porosity between industry and academia has created opportunities 
for more rapid translation of basic discoveries to patient needs.  Additionally, 
both physicians and fundamental scientists have broadened their career oppor-
tunities, and movement between industry and academia—almost unheard of 
two decades ago—now occurs regularly.  At the same time, numerous examples 
exist of how these translational efforts have benefited not only patients but also 
investigators and academic institutions as well.  Despite many potential advan-
tages of closer interactions between industry and academia, other issues, such 
as conflicts of interest (both real and perceived), continue to pose challenges. 
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specialty pharmaceutical companies; 
member, Board of Directors, Topica 
Pharmaceuticals, Brickell Biotech, and 
Vyteris (2011–present)). At the outset, 
we acknowledge that much of what 
we shall discuss below represents our 
opinions rooted in factual occurrences 
of the past three decades. This contri-
bution is—in every sense—an op-ed. 
To grasp fully the implications of 
the ‘‘Changing Roles of Industry and 
Academia,’’ it is necessary to under-
stand the historical view of the role 
of the pharmaceutical and biophar-
maceutical industry in bringing prod-
ucts to the patient-care marketplace. 
Conversely, it is necessary to under-
stand the traditional role academic 
institutions and research institutes have 
in the creation and discovery process-
es. These two self-assigned roles—one 
by industry and the other academia—
rarely converged in biomedical sci-
ence. All of this has changed in the past 
two or three decades, coincident with, 
but not wholly because of, the advent 
of the power of recombinant DNA 
technology. As a result of our unique 
experiences, we have chosen to focus 
on industry–academia collaborations. 
We acknowledge that industry-based 
in-house research and development 
continues to be robust. However, our 
thesis is that an evolution is afoot in 
which two major research enterprises 
are converging. This constitutes the 
basis for our discussion herein. 
Recognizing that we are taking sub-
stantial license with definitions, we 
believe that it would be acceptable to 
define the traditional, ‘‘typical’’ industry 
model as possessing the following com-
ponents: (i) a strong in-house research 
effort, often comprising scientists 
focused on fundamental chemistry and 
biochemistry; (ii) an equally strong in-
house group directed toward preclini-
cal development, including cellular and 
tissue models, animal models, formula-
tions, pharmacodynamics and pharma-
cokinetics, and toxicology; (iii) a robust 
clinical effort with the responsibility 
for taking the best drug or biological 
candidates from early safety data all 
the way through product approval. In 
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dermatology, perhaps the most cogent 
example of this development process 
is embodied in the development by 
Hoffmann-LaRoche of multiple retinoid 
candidates in the 1970s and 1980s. The 
efforts by Hoffmann-LaRoche resulted 
in products, such as isotretinoin and 
acitretin, that in the United States ben-
efit thousands of patients with severe, 
debilitating diseases including cystic 
acne, psoriasis, and heritable disorders 
of keratinization. 
On the academic/research institute 
side of the equation, our definition—
most typically embodied in research-
intensive universities and medical 
centers—would have the following: 
(i) a strong, research-focused faculty 
comprising both MD and PhD mem-
bers; (ii) a meritocracy in which the 
strong emphasis on academic rewards 
(e.g., promotion and membership 
in honorific societies) is based on 
research excellence and innovation; 
(iii) an almost mandatory metric of 
independence—National Institutes of 
Health (NIH) and/or foundation fund-
ing over a sustained period of time; 
and, (iv) conversely, less emphasis on 
the application of those discoveries to 
improvements in patient care. Classic 
examples of such institutions include 
most of the US News and World 
Report top 15–20 medical schools/
medical centers and others, such as 
the Rockefeller University. Historically, 
not only was there little convergence 
of the industry and academic mod-
els, but until approximately 30 years 
ago, indeed, for a faculty member at 
one of these types of  institutions to 
accept specific industry-based support 
carried a risk tantamount to loss of one’s 
academic purity.
a neW ParaDIGm
All of this changed a little more than 
30 years ago with the advent of two 
bold events—one scientific and the 
other pure business—but in a curious 
way, they were proven to be inexora-
bly related. The initial scientific efforts 
of Dr Herbert Boyer at UCSF and Dr 
Stanley Cohen at Stanford University 
created the basis for founding the field 
of recombinant DNA technology. Their 
discoveries were perceived by Robert 
Swanson, a venture capitalist, to form 
the grist for creation of a whole new 
industry in which recombinant DNA 
technology would be used to create pro-
tein products for therapeutic use. Boyer 
and Swanson founded Genentech in 
1976, and within a short time had pro-
duced human growth hormone, human 
insulin, and others (Teeter, 2010). By 
1985, Genentech’s first product, growth 
hormone, was approved by the Food 
and Drug Administration. In the same 
window of time was the founding, in 
1981, of Chiron Corporation by Drs 
William Rutter, a distinguished faculty 
member of UCSF, Edward Penhoet, and 
Pablo Valenzuela (Wikipedia, 2011a). 
The forces that would ultimately break 
down the walls between academia and 
industry were already being breached 
by distinguished scientists at research-
intensive academic institutions. Further, 
many of the best and brightest young 
scientists being trained by the likes of 
Boyer, Cohen, and Rutter were now 
seeking jobs in industry, rather than 
taking the traditional pathways into aca-
demic careers.
Whereas the nascent biotechnology 
industry was emerging in California, in 
other regions companies aspired to take 
advantage of the wealth of scientific cre-
ativity and expertise in universities. In 
the late 1970s, Monsanto Corporation, 
of St Louis, in its first move into pharma-
ceuticals, signed a multiyear contract 
with Harvard to support research by 
Dr Judah Folkman. Within a short time, 
Hoechst AG and Massachusetts General 
Hospital (MGH) signed an agreement 
in which $70 million would be avail-
able over 10 years to develop a new 
department of molecular biology at the 
hospital. On the heels of that announce-
ment came a second Monsanto initia-
tive, this time between Monsanto and 
Washington University in St Louis. The 
agreement, considered by Monsanto to 
be a true ‘‘strategic investment,’’ was to 
be a model that almost all—faculty and 
industry alike—could support (Culliton, 
1982). As one of us (EAB) was on the 
faculty at the Washington University 
School of Medicine at the time, we shall 
describe in more detail some of the 
essential elements. 
Perhaps most important of the prin-
ciples was that the arrangement was 
institution to institution; i.e., not an 
arrangement directly between any 
specific investigator and Monsanto, 
but rather at the institutional level. 
Such a model made it possible for a 
review committee comprising both 
Washington University and Monsanto 
scientists and administrators to choose 
among proposals in a way akin to, but 
less cumbersome than, the NIH pro-
cess. It further allowed for complete 
freedom of publication of all research 
following a brief review of data (and/
or manuscript) to establish the desir-
ability of filing patents on the dis-
coveries. In no case, however, was 
any specific faculty member to ben-
efit directly from capturing intellectual 
property—another manifestation of the 
institution-to-institution nature of the 
relationship. This stipulation also miti-
gated, at least in part, the concern for 
personal conflicts of interest among 
faculty members, a concern that con-
tinues to reverberate even as more and 
more industry–academic relationships 
are forged (Steinbrook, 2009). As Dr 
Howard Schneiderman, Monsanto’s 
Senior Vice President, said at the time, 
‘‘[This is] … a true partnership.…It is a 
clear sign that Monsanto … is serious 
about moving into the pharma ceutical 
business.…$23.5 million spent at 
Washington University is $23.5 mil-
lion that will not go to the company’s 
in-house labs.…We believe we’ll get 
more at Washington University than 
we’d get by spending the money in-
house’’ (Culliton, 1982). This blunt 
assessment was to adumbrate a model 
that has flowered in the past 15 years 
as more and more companies have 
scaled back their internal research and 
discovery budgets in favor of seeking 
intellectual property from academic 
and research institutions and smaller 
start-up companies. 
Closer to home, various research-
intensive departments of dermatology 
have concluded their own affiliations 
and/or research sponsorships. The 
MGH/Harvard Cutaneous Biology 
Research Center was established in 
1989 as a result of a multi-year agree-
ment between MGH/Harvard Medical 
School and Shiseido. Its goal was ‘‘to 
conduct research on the skin and 
its adnexa using molecular biology 
techniques from multi disciplinary 
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areas’’ (MGH/Harvard Cutaneous 
Biology Research Center Website, 
2011). In another variation on 
the theme, the Department of 
Dermatology at the University of 
Michigan received multi-year support 
from Johnson & Johnson to carry out 
fundamental research on the molecu-
lar basis of retinoid actions in the skin 
with a goal of designing better reti-
noids for therapeutic use. In addition, 
the Johnson & Johnson agreement 
supported the department’s efforts 
to define molecular mechanisms of 
photoaging and natural aging. The 
Johnson & Johnson resources allowed 
Michigan’s department of dermatol-
ogy to continue to make major con-
tributions to understanding cutaneous 
aging—now under NIH support. Last, 
thanks to the philanthropy of Ronald 
O. Perelman, the CEO of Revlon, Inc, 
but without commercial overtones, the 
Department of Dermatology of New 
York University School of Medicine, 
one of the oldest and most distin-
guished in the world, became the 
Ronald O. Perelman Department of 
Dermatology in 1991. The Perelman 
gift did, however, enable the depart-
ment, in 2006, to open an entire floor 
devoted to cutaneous biology in the 
new translational research building 
(New York University Department of 
Dermatology Website, 2011). 
It is important to ask whether, aside 
from financial imperatives in industry, 
there were (and there are today) other 
forces that allowed the shift from the 
commercial versus academic silo men-
talities to a new model. In our view, 
there were three: (i) the first—perhaps 
the most important—is that most clini-
cal and fundamental scientists alike 
want their discoveries and research to 
have relevance to human health; (ii) 
at the time (and persisting today) there 
were Congressional cries for relevance 
in research; and (iii) both institutions 
and individuals sought recognition 
and financial rewards for their research 
investments and creativity. 
1. Investigator wish for relevance: 
The existence of NIH-sponsored 
General Clinical Research 
Centers (GCRCs) validates this 
assertion. In EAB's experience as 
Program Director for Stanford’s 
GCRC, the majority of protocols 
were investigator driven. More 
importantly, protocols were often 
the result of a faculty member’s 
fundamental discovery whose 
validity he/she wished to test in 
the appropriate patient population. 
Many times, these were small 
proof-of-concept trials to establish 
that an intervention in a putative 
pathway could be established. 
If successful, these studies 
would often then be scaled into 
larger, sometimes, multi-center 
trials in which (in keeping with 
appropriate conflict-of-interest 
policies) the discoverer would 
either be excluded or subjected to 
scrupulous, independent oversight. 
Alternatively, the faculty member 
might, with the blessing of his/
her institution, be founder of a 
company based on the discovery, 
and through this mechanism move 
the research to application. 
2. Congressional mandate  
for relevance: Surrounding, 
and enhancing, the emergence 
of faculty- and industry-driven 
collaboration was then—as now—
an unrelenting call for relevance in 
federally supported research. The 
cries became most strident with 
the initiation by Senator William 
Proxmire of his annual Golden 
Fleece Awards (Wikipedia, 2011b). 
Even for those who espouse—and 
most well-informed people do—
the notion of the unity of science 
up and down the evolutionary 
tree, it was at least minimally 
a threat to be a Golden Fleece 
Awardee. In a more positive vein, 
the establishment of NIH support 
for excellence in patient-oriented 
research is further validation 
of societal need and desire for 
relevance. 
3. Personal and institutional 
recognition and financial gain: 
Finally, perhaps not least, among 
the driving forces are what might 
be called personal and institutional 
desires for public, as opposed to 
academic, recognition for being an 
individual or institution of discovery 
and creativity. This recognition 
comes, at least, in two forms: 
public acknowledgment (e.g., in 
news media) and financial. As Dr 
Judith Swain, the prominent chair 
of the Department of Medicine, 
once posited (tongue in cheek) that 
an important measure of success 
at Stanford was the founding ‘‘of 
at least one company.’’ Dr Swain, 
having founded two companies, 
went on herself to become dean at a 
major, research-intensive academic 
institution, and later the founding 
Director of the Singapore Institute of 
Clinical Sciences of the Singapore 
Agency for Science, Technology and 
Research. Financially, as well, both 
faculty members and institutions 
have gained enormously from a 
wide acceptance of commercial 
realities. Again, reflecting on 
the experiences at Stanford (and 
admittedly describing the model 
in a rather simplistic manner for 
the sake of brevity), the division of 
royalties from a product licensed 
from Stanford University School 
of Medicine would be a modest 
percentage off the top to University 
funds for graduate student support; 
of the remaining, one-third to the 
faculty inventor, one-third to the 
faculty member’s department, and 
one-third to the School of Medicine. 
Such royalty arrangements yielded 
literally hundreds of millions of 
dollars to various institutions over 
the duration of the patent lives of 
certain inventions. On the East 
Coast, the licensing of patents based 
on inventions by faculty members 
has also generated hundreds 
of millions of dollars in royalty 
revenues for institutions such as 
New York University, Columbia 
University, and the University 
of Florida for developments 
in ground-breaking biological 
drugs, DNA cloning, and cancer 
chemotherapeutics, respectively. 
Industry has—at least potentially—
gained as well. Through enhanced 
academic–industry relationships, the 
‘‘Monsantos’’ of industry have 
significantly broadened their access 
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to fundamental discoveries. One of 
the most significant examples of this 
occurred early in 2010, when shortly 
after a Nobel Prize was awarded 
for RNA interference technology, 
Merck acquired the company, Sirna 
Therapeutics, for $1.1 billion. A sec-
ond example relevant to dermatology 
is the elucidation at the University of 
Queensland in Australia that the sap 
of the weed, Euphorbia peplus, con-
tains elements useful for treatment of 
actinic keratoses and non-melanoma 
skin cancers (Ogbourne et al., 2004). 
The discovery and purification of the 
active chemical element formed the 
basis for the founding of Peplin. As a 
result of Peplin’s successful clinical 
trials, the company was purchased in 
2009 by LEO-Pharma of Denmark. 
On the cost-saving side of the equa-
tion, it is almost certain that increased 
academic–industry associations have 
allowed reduction in the year-in, year-
out costs of in-house fundamental 
research.
tHe FUtUre
If our thesis that there now exists 
increased porosity between and among 
academic institutions, free-standing 
research institutes, and industry is 
valid, what does this suggest for the 
future? This year, as the Society for 
Investigative Dermatology marks its 
75th Anniversary, we already have a 
foreshadowing of activities to come. 
Increasingly, so-called ‘‘big pharma’’ 
companies are taking steps to have 
greater and earlier access to potentially 
interesting products. To do so, some 
companies have established venture 
funds using financial resources that are 
managed through independent ven-
ture capital firms. One such initiative 
was established by a major pharma-
ceutical house based in the European 
Union. Its funds, through a limited part-
nership in a well-established venture 
investment firm, gave the company 
access to nonconfidential information 
that might stimulate further interest and 
diligence under confidentiality agree-
ments. In some cases, this information 
led to ongoing support of the smaller 
companies’ projects and/or an option 
arrangement in which, if certain mile-
stones were met, acquisition of the 
technology or the company itself by the 
big pharma partner would be consum-
mated. We also envisage the expansion 
of university-sponsored venture funds 
that serve to commercialize technolo-
gies developed by their own faculty 
and students by co-investing along-
side other investors in companies that 
are based on those technologies. This 
would allow academic institutions 
more proximal and direct involvement 
in fledging projects and concepts as 
they develop into monetized commer-
cial interests. To the degree that such 
initiatives are implemented, there will 
be an increasing burden on institu-
tions at large and on subsidiary groups, 
such as Institutional Review Boards, to 
monitor—and even to police—real and 
perceived conflicts of interest. Here, 
the Institute of Medicine Guidelines 
(Steinbrook, 2009) constitute a back-
bone—but by no means an ex cathedra 
solution—for what will necessarily be 
an evolving situation. 
A second view of the future is 
emerging in the form of regional ini-
tiatives. Whereas historically much 
of the biotechnology activity has 
occurred on the West and East Coasts, 
other regions have increasingly begun 
‘‘seed’’ initiatives to draw upon foci of 
expertise. Typical of these initiatives is 
the existence of at least one, usually 
several, academic, research-rich insti-
tutions along with specialized indus-
tries, such as excellence in device or 
electronic engineering. The regional 
political bodies then offer incentives 
(usually in the form of tax abatement 
or partial investment remission) from 
public revenues to stimulate economic 
growth. In addition, the regions are 
now also considering other ways, 
such as building of incubator space, to 
attract new biopharmaceutical and/or 
bio-device companies.
Finally, we predict that there will be 
smoothing of the processes involved 
in industry’s courtship (and vice versa) 
of academic-based fundamental 
research. We sense that the voices that 
have been increasingly strident about 
faculty conflicts of interest over the 
past 10 years may be softening as both 
academic institutions and industry 
acknowledge that effective guidelines 
for interactions need to be established 
and respected. Further, having oppor-
tunities for academic institutions and 
their faculty members to translate dis-
coveries effectively into products will 
be advantageous for all—the academ-
ic institutions, the faculty members, 
industry, and most importantly for 
society at large.
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